Mexico's pursue and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a pro-growth policy strategy that deepened Mexico's economic liberalization process at a time of crisis and macroeconomic stabilization. In that context, NAFTA constituted a commitment device to investment that ensured continuity to both the stabilization and the liberalization processes. NAFTA was possible for Mexico thanks to a new coalition between public and private elites that had recently gone through a deep transformation process themselves. After more than twenty years, NAFTA has significant results in terms of investment and levels and diversification of trade; however, the evidence on its impact in growth and development is mixed. The asymmetry of negotiation power between the United States and Mexico affected the agreement, but its final shape and implementation were impacted in important ways by Mexico's political realities. Two examples of this: The highly hierarchical, camarilla-style line of command of the Mexican team derived in in controversial concessions and strategic mistakes in the areas of agriculture and financial services. Later, a corporatist, authoritarian regime induced a weak supplementary labor accord that could have had the potential of effectively promoting higher equity through strengthened workers rights and more democratic industrial relations.
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The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 2. NAFTA's main objectives are eliminating trade barriers, facilitating and promoting cross-border flow of goods, services and investment, increasing conditions of fair economic competition and property rights protection, and establishing the corresponding joint mechanisms for resolution of disputes (NAFTA Secretariat, 2014) . From Mexico's governmental perspective, NAFTA would allow to "regulate the growing trade flows between [the three] countries and incentivize investment and jobs." (Salinas de Gortari, 1994) 3. More specifically, the agreement was expected "to increase the growth of non-oil exports, and to achieve a greater inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) within the country […] based on the understanding that the former would generate greater employment within manufacturing industries, which use labor intensively, and that the latter would complement internal savings, which had proven insufficient to finance the country's economic growth." (Serra Puche, 2015) 3 4. Pursuing a free trade agreement with the United States was part of a larger process of reforms implemented by a relatively young and very cohesive group of Mexican economists. This group, which fully dominated the economic policy realm in Mexico between 1988 and 2000, saw in the free market approach to development a way out of the debt and inflationary crisis the country was going through since 1982; they also saw in it the way to a much needed new cycle of sustained economic growth. 6. By the end of 1989, foreign investment had not reacted favorably enough to these reforms and to the debt-reduction agreement the Mexican government had signed with commercial banks (Lustig, 1992) . The Salinas administration then saw bilateral commercial integration with the United States as a potentially advantageous position in what could be seen as a race against other countries trying to attract investment through economic liberalization -particularly the former socialist countries (Pastor & Wise, 1994) . The entry to NAFTA would also serve to justify at the domestic level Mexico's economic reforms as part of a broader transformation process of which Canada and the United States were also part of; not only the benefits, but also the costs would be shared by other countries besides Mexico (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000) . 4 For a timely and detailed account of the particular experience of Mexico during the so-called "lost decade" in Latin America, see Lustig (1992) . See Camp (1990 and 2010) for the origins and profile of the political group in power at the time. 5 A recent overview of these years as part of Mexico's broader economic and political trajectory can be found in Shirk & Edmonds-Poli (2015) .
The North American Free Trade Agreement
7. The agreement covered the broad areas of trade in goods, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, investment, services and intellectual property, and dispute settlement provisions. From the Mexican point of view, the sectors where negotiations entailed the highest difficulty in terms of defending its interests were those of energy, agriculture, automobiles, and also the dispute settlement provisions, particularly regarding antidumping (von Bertrab, 1996) . The financial services and investment sectors would also prove to have their own complexities.
8. Mexico would eventually obtain significant gains from NAFTA in terms of trade, nonoil exports and investment (see below). However, the Mexican government made important concessions during the negotiations due to different reasons: For example, in order to provide enough incentives to its counterparts to keep negotiating and reach an agreement, maize -a key crop in the millions-of-people Mexico's rural economy-was very rapidly put on the table by Mexico, as part of a proposal to liberalize agriculture across-the-board. 9. In the financial services realm, Mexico accepted the principle of national treatment for financial service providers, and discarded the permanent caps on foreign investment in the banking sector; both concessions were made too soon and in exchange for no concession at all from Canada or the United States because the two Finance Ministry officers in charge followed instructions from the Trade Ministry to quickly reach a deal, without having complete information of the negotiation as a whole -President Salinas himself had put Trade in charge of negotiations in this sector in spite of Finance resistance; after this incident, Finance and the Central Bank took over. At the same time, Minister of Trade Serra made every effort to maintain centralized control of the whole negotiation through people from his most 6 These and other specific details on the NAFTA negotiations typically come from Cameron & Tomlin (2000) , unless indicated otherwise. trusted group of collaborators (camarilla) only. 7 This management strategy eventually proved to be inefficient and a less centralized one was implemented (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000) .
10
. Some of the features of Mexican politics impacted the negotiation process more in general. It has been argued, for example, that the negotiating position of the Mexican government was debilitated by its lack of accountability to, and lack of participation of a wider spectrum of potentially affected domestic actors. Instead, Mexican negotiators kept close a rather reduced group of allies from the private sector, namely the economically most influential representatives of it. This was particularly clear in the case of agriculture, where the millions of small, low-income producers did not find see their interests represented during the negotiations (Santacruz, 1997) . As it will be shown below, this actually responded to the ruling coalition that was reconfigured during the years of economic reform. (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 123-124 to negotiate two supplemental accords on labor and environmental standards, which basically would be intended to ensure that every country effectively enforced their own environmental and labor laws and regulations (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000) .
14. Since the first stages of the negotiations, visible critics of NAFTA in Mexico had voiced their preoccupations NAFTA's potential negative impacts on human rights, workplace health and safety issues, environmental matters and foreign competition (Lustig, 1992) . Some of them organized and proceeded to establish active links and cooperation with several similar groups opposed to NAFTA within the United States and Canada (Heredia, 1994) . The sum of many of these voices, along with the new political distribution of power in the US Congress played an important role in the demand for the supplemental accords.
15. The additional round of negotiations and the corresponding congressional lobbying process, where Mexico showed unprecedented proactivity (Lewis, 1993 in Heredia, 1994 , took place between March and August 1993, and resulted in an environmental accord with enormous potential thanks to the vigorous support of environmental activists and organizations. In contrast, the labor accord was born much weaker, covering only health and safety, child labor and minimum wages due to the reluctance of the Mexican government to alter the corporatist nature of its industrial relations -which were completely left out of the table along with any intention to address workers' rights issues whatsoever (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000) . Table 1 Mexico between 1993-2000 should not be attributed to NAFTA only, but also to the large demand generated by the 1990s economic boom of the United States, and to the depreciation of the Mexican peso in the aftermath of the 1994-1995 peso crisis (Blecker & Esquivel, 2010) . Another example would be that, as stated by Villareal & Fergusson (2014) , the over-a-million jobs displacement occurred in Mexico's agricultural sector between 1991 and 2000 found by Scott, Salas, & Campbell (2006) could also be atributed to unilateral, domestic reforms in that country like the land reform or the elminination of subsidies and state enterprises.
27. In general, recent reviews of NAFTA impact assessments describe outcomes that fall short from the most optimistic expectations of NAFTA advocates. This is the case of 
Commitment to Investment in Authoritarian Mexico
28. NAFTA can be considered a commitment device that allowed the Mexican government to signal domestic and foreign investors that the macroeconomic stabilization and economic liberalization processes initiated in the early 1980s would be maintained in the future. The agreement was possible, among other things, because of the profound transformation these processes generated in Mexico's political and economic elites, which have proven to be of great importance in this country's contemporary history (Camp, 2002) . 29. Regarding the private sector, on the one hand a severely reduced fiscal space (due to high debt and low public revenues), trade liberalization, deregulation, opening to FDI and privatization debilitated the previously dominant statist and private importsubstituting elites by reducing the sources of rents available for them to extract. On the other hand, these same measures promoted the generation of new export and foreign investors elites by allowing many old (i.e., statist, import-substituting) and new private entrepreneurs to gain monopoly rents through deregulation, by transferring to them most of the manufacturing sector through privatization, and by attracting more FDI through less discretionary rules. That renovated private sector elite had now every incentive to support a long-term commitment with an enduring liberalization process, of which NAFTA would be perhaps its most salient device (Tornell & Esquivel, 1995 (Camp, 2002 (Camp, & 2010 .
This dominance would eventually contribute to a deep political elite division by
alienating from key positions to those who did not share the free market ideology, which in turn may be considered as one of the possible factors pushing towards the eventual demise of the ruling party PRI in the year 2000. 9 It was this strong political elite, led at the time by President Salinas, who proposed, negotiated and implemented NAFTA as a sine qua non part of the ongoing stabilization and liberalization process. In spite of its dominance, this group acted as a coalition generator rather than as a full-fledged autocrat (at least regarding the economic reform process), always making sure to have powerful groups supporting these reforms (Tornell & Esquivel, 1995) .
32. The change of incentives in the private sector and an ideologically renovated political leadership in Mexico's economic policy were crucial to make NAFTA a reality. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the leaders of populist and mass organizations in the labor and peasant realm still enjoyed a strong ideological and political influence over the national political leadership. As the process of economic reforms progressed, this privileged position of influence was taken by the now profree market private sector that, along with the Salinas administration, became the leaders of a new elite coalition in Mexico -a pro-macro stabilization, pro-economic liberalization, and therefore, a pro-NAFTA coalition (Poitras & Robinson, 1994) . (Pastor & Wise, 1994; Poitras & Robinson, 1994) . Although the PRI consistently utilized illegal and non-democratic practices to stay in power, it should be noted that its strength came also from the actual political loyalty of voters via, among other, the systematic manipulation of public spendingwith well identifiable spikes during election times-and the political focalization of certain public programs -like the National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, Pronasol) during the Salinas administration (Magaloni, 2006) . 
Federation of Goods and Services Firms (Federación de Sindicatos de Empresas de
Bienes y Servicios, FESEBES) also showed its support along with worries about jobs and wage levels. At not point were these voices strong enough to represent a real veto point (nor intended to) in the domestic politics of NAFTA in Mexico.
38. By the time NAFTA was proposed and being negotiated by the Mexican government, mass media in Mexico was still a monopoly with strong links to the state, and major press electronic and written outlets covered NAFTA providing only scarce information and no critical analysis (Heredia, 1994) . Among the intellectual community, ideas about free trade and economic liberalization had gained popularity, at least among members of some of the most prestigious national research and education institutions located in Mexico City like the Colegio de México (Poitras & Robinson, 1994) .
39. NAFTA could also count on relevant public support: in 1991, the share of Mexican population showing total and somewhat approval to NAFTA was 80.4% (with a 22.4% no opinion), and in 1993 the same share was 73.5% (31% no opinion), the two most important sources of their support to NAFTA being a positive evaluation of President Salinas's performance and a positive attitude towards the United States (Davis, 1998) .
Finally, the pro-NAFTA coalition also included an Advisory Board for the Free Trade
Agreement chaired by the minister of trade and composed by representatives from the executive and legislative powers, the labor, agricultural and business sectors, and the academia. 12 Unfortunately, the Board's role was strictly advisory and not decisions were taken by it (Heredia, 1994) , which for every practical purpose may have reduced its role to a mere device to legitimize decisions that were taken elsewhere.
12 The complete list of members of the Board can be found as Annex 3 of Serra Puche (2015).
41. The pro-NAFTA coalition on the private sector side was composed by big, medium and small businesses organizations. As the main representative of the private sector in NAFTA negotiations, the Exim Business Associations Board (Coordinadora de Organizaciones Empresariales de Comercio Exterior, COECE) played a particularly relevant role. The big businesses leading the private sector side of the coalition included large manufacturing companies strong enough to compete in the United
States, medium-sized manufacturers with exporting potential in certain specific niches, fruit and vegetable producers, capital-intensive foreign firms and domestic suppliers of foreign businesses in Mexico. As stated before, these firms embraced enthusiastically the idea of a free trade agreement because they would benefit directly from it, and also because they saw in it the assurance that economic liberalization and stability would be maintained in the future (Tornell & Esquivel, 1995 (Thacker, 2000) .
43. The medium and small sized businesses were also part of the coalition, represented mainly by the National Chamber of Industry (Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación, Canacintra) . Unlike the larger firms, these smaller ones were not particularly interested in foreign trade, and they even showed some initial reservations regarding the negative impact NAFTA could have on them. To these reservations the government answered by offering incentives like a preferential credit program for micro and small businesses (Programa de Apoyo para la Micro y Pequeña Empresa, Promyp). In the end, they supported the agreement not only because of those incentives, but also because, as in the case of the big businesses, they perceived the agreement as an integral part of the ongoing macro stabilization process which had delivered lower levels inflation already and it was expected to deliver future economic stability. (Thacker, 2000) .
46. COECE's feedback to the negotiations process included not only the entrepreneurial experience of its members, but also a number of commissioned impact assessments for different economic sectors NAFTA was expected to impact, which at least at the time of the negotiations were not shared much beyond COECE and the NAFTA negotiating team. COECE's bias towards the big business interests, its access to firsthand and specialized information, and the pro-market view of development its members shared with the government negotiators, granted it great informational and strategic advantage en relation to the interests of medium and small size industry (Pastor & Wise 1994) . Unlike the previously mentioned Advisory Board for the Free Trade Agreement, COECE did influence the decisions that were made during the negotiation process (Heredia, 1994; Thacker, 2000; Alba & Vega, 2002) . 52. RMLAC was a network of at least 80 labor, environmental and human rights groups, many of which had some connection to the leftist party PRD. Although most of its members actually believed that the agreement could bring more investment and jobs, they had the perception that the negotiations were not necessarily protecting
Mexico's interests in the best possible way. They were also concerned about the non-transparent way in which the process was being conducted, the highly exclusive influence of the political and economic elites on it, the lack of a public consultation about it, and the insufficient protection that the agreement would bring to labor, consumers and the environment. Along with some of its partners in Canada and the United States, RMLAC even proposed an alternative version of the agreement that took into account these concerns (Poitras & Robinson, 1994; Heredia, 1994) . In the end, the combined efforts of different actors opposing NAFTA were not enough to significantly alter the results of negotiations. 
Conclusions

